LAB 007 · CONTAINMENT ASSURANCE

Can We Prove the Agent Is Actually Contained?

A stop command records an intention. Assurance requires independent evidence that every execution path and authority has been neutralized.

Stopping the visible process may leave credentials, delegates, queues, tool sessions, network paths, persistent state, or recovery mechanisms available.

This Lab is an educational containment-assurance prototype using fictional data. It does not control production agents, terminate workloads, revoke credentials, alter network access, or perform security actions. Execution is never performed against real systems.

No real agent, credential, process, tool session, or external system is modified. Real execution is always not_performed.

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Stopped is not contained

Containment action

What control did the system attempt to apply?

Outcomes: Restrict · Isolate · Terminate

An enforcement intention or command response is not proof.

Containment assurance

What evidence proves that the intended boundary is now effective?

Outcomes: Confirmed · Partial · Unverified · Failed

Precedence: Failed > Partial > Unverified > Confirmed

An agent must never assess or certify its own containment. Assurance is produced by an independent control plane using external evidence.

Containment has a blast radius

A stop, isolate, or terminate command may leave runtimes, sessions, credentials, delegates, queues, tools, networks, state, or recovery paths available.

Scenario presets

Select a preset to fill every control, then evaluate containment assurance—or adjust the fictional evidence yourself.

Assurance inspector

Inspect or adjust fictional evidence fields, then evaluate. The agent never certifies its own containment.

Case identity and enforcement

Independent assurance checks

Primary runtime stopped
Active sessions revoked
Delegated credentials revoked
Tool access disabled
Queued actions cancelled
Scheduled work cancelled
Child agents stopped
Network egress blocked
Alternate network paths checked
Persistent state quarantined
Restart/recovery disabled
Telemetry coverage complete
Evidence freshness acceptable
Evidence source independence
Post-containment activity absent

Assurance boundary

Lab 005 asks what the agent did. Lab 006 asks what containment action should be applied. Lab 007 asks whether that containment action actually worked—using evidence outside the agent.

Diagram titled Containment assurance boundary: Containment action feeds independent evidence collection, then assurance checks, then Confirmed, Partial, Unverified, or Failed. An assurance perimeter covers runtime, identity and sessions, credentials, tools, queues, delegates, network, and state and recovery.
Containment is not the command we issue. It is a state we must verify.

Teaching notes

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